# Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 1

Language: English

Pages: 352

ISBN: 019928590X

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

*Oxford Studies in Epistemology* is a major new biennial volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe, and Australasia, it will publish exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Anyone wanting to understand the latest developments at the leading edge of the discipline can start here.

Editorial board includes Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose, Richard Fumerton, Alvin Goldman, Alan Hajek, Gilbert Harman, Frank Jackson, James Joyce, Scott Sturgeon, Jonathan Vogel, and Timothy Williamson.

El concepto de Ideología, Volume 4: Postestructuralismo, Postmodernismo y Postmarxismo

The Last Three Minutes: Conjectures About The Ultimate Fate Of The Universe

The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism

University Press). —— (2000b) ‘Scepticism and Evidence’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 625. This page intentionally left blank 2. The Fallacy of Epistemicism James Cargile 1. a problem There exists an infinite series, the natural numbers, such that any property which is possessed by 0 and by the successor of any number that has it, is possessed by all the numbers. This is equivalent to the Least Number Principle (LNP): for all m and n, m < n, if m has a property F and n does

guarantee truth, so we need an antecedent notion of consistency not generated by implicit definition; and what justifies a belief about consistency? (Admittedly, the notion of consistency required here may be one on which proponents of different logics may agree, so if this were the only point to be made it might seem that the implicit definition strategy could at least serve as a justification of the parts of logic about which controversies are likely.) A more fundamental point is that those who

an argument from A and not A to B not to be truth-preserving, but call the argument invalid nonetheless simply because it fails to respect some relevance condition that she imposes on consequence. Here the disagreement seems to be a purely verbal one about the meaning of ‘consequence’. But I take such cases not to be the interesting ones. What would be interesting is if someone rejected the rule because she thought it wasn’t truth-preserving: that’s the view of ‘‘dialetheists’’ (Priest 1998), who

is NUMBER, for example, A might be taken to be the conjunction of axioms for second-order arithmetic). We may demonstrate the consistency of a, i.e. Åa >, as above. Within the logic of postulation, we can then derive A from a, that is, we can show: A a (using no assumptions concerning the initial domain). This translates into a proof of &a A. From &a A and Åa >, we can derive Åa A by ordinary modal reasoning; and from this follows the consistency of A, i.e. ÅA. (We might think of the axioms A

It is important to note that I am not claiming here that aj ¼ Pr(R(Ki (rj , m)) in Theorem 4.3. While this holds in the synchronous case, it does not hold in general. The reason we cannot expect this to hold in general is that, in the synchronous case, the sets R(Ki (rj , m)) are disjoint, so Pn j¼1 Pr(R(Ki (rj , m)) ¼ 1. This is not in general true in the asynchronous case. I return to this issue shortly. The obvious analogue to Corollary 4.4 does not hold for the Elga approach. Indeed, the same