Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide (Cambridge Critical Guides)

Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide (Cambridge Critical Guides)

Language: English

Pages: 356

ISBN: 1107437237

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


On the Genealogy of Morality is Nietzsche's most influential, provocative, and challenging work of ethics. In this volume of newly commissioned essays, fourteen leading philosophers offer fresh insights into many of the work's central questions: How did our dominant values originate and what functions do they really serve? What future does the concept of "evil" have - and can it be revalued? What sorts of virtues and ideals does Nietzsche advocate, and are they necessarily incompatible with aspirations to democracy and a free society? What are the nature, role, and scope of genealogy in his critique of morality - and why doesn't his own evaluative standard receive a genealogical critique? Taken together, this superb collection illuminates what a post-Christian and indeed post-moral life might look like, and asks to what extent Nietzsche's Genealogy manages to move beyond morality.

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moral concepts of guilt and duty. It is rather a different process whereby the concepts of guilt and obligation, already understood in a generic moral sense, are enrolled in the service of the aims of morality understood in a specific sense, namely, as “slave morality” or “Christian” morality. According to my interpretation, therefore, Nietzsche takes the Christian representation of guilt to be not a particular account of the ordinary feeling of guilt, but a perversion of the susceptibility to that

risk-aversion there would be dangerous living and Rausch – that “over-fullness of spirit” out of which new values and new art forms would be forged. 86 simon may Though these are all expressions of the life-affirming spirit, as Nietzsche depicts it, they are the cart not the horse. The reversals on which they depend – be they characterized in terms of their affects, cognitions, or valuings – cannot be achieved directly. They can be achieved only by those who are no longer dogged by the “problem

when he says that an “orientation to the outside,” to an “Other” that is apprehended as “opposing,” is essential to ressentiment? This obviously means more than the fact that this psychological process contingently has its origin in a confrontation with a not-self that is interpreted as different and hostile. Nietzsche gives us a clue to what else is involved here when he imagines the slaves exhorting one another “let us be different . . ., let us be good” (GM, I, 13). This indicates that it is

consequently its means too are bad. (A, 56) So Nietzsche’s suggestion seems to be that there may be kinds of selfdeception, even about deep issues, which, while no doubt undesirable, nevertheless do not merit the contempt he thinks is called for by ressentiment. But if we take seriously his insistence that it is not the lie per se – the motivated selfmisunderstanding – that is most deeply objectionable about ressentiment, but the “bad ends” to which the lie is told, does this not take us back to

consequences and narrow perspectives in the service of this one will: valuation itself is only this will to power. A critique of being from the point of view of any one of these values is something absurd and erroneous. Even supposing that a process of decline begins in this way, this process still stands in the service of this will. To appraise being itself! But this appraisal itself is still this being! – and if we say no, we still do what we are. One must comprehend the absurdity of this

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