Germany and the Second World War, Volume 3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa, 1939-1941

Germany and the Second World War, Volume 3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa, 1939-1941

Bernd Stegemann, Gerhard Schreiber, Detlef Vogel

Language: English

Pages: 822

ISBN: B000OLE03S

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


This is the third in the comprehensive ten-volume Germany and the Second World War. The volumes so far published have achieved international acclaim as a major contribution to historical study. Under the auspices of the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History), a team of renowned historians has combined a full synthesis of existing material with the latest research to produce what will be the definitive history of the Second World War.

Volume 3 explores the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean region and examines the dramatic military events of this period. It shows how German policy in this area was largely determined by the attitude of the German leadership, especially Hitler, towards Mussolini's Italy, and the volume thus sheds important new light on the alliance policy of theThird Reich. The comprehensive analysis, based on detailed scholarly research, is underpinned by a full apparatus of maps, diagrams, and tables.

Intensively researched and documented, Germany and the Second World War is an undertaking of unparalleled scope and authority. It will prove indispensable to all historians of the twentieth century.

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continental bloc was still under discussion as a kind of interim solution within the realization of Hitler's programme, implying, among other things, the establishment of a greater Soviet sphere. Accordingly, Berlin was unable to adopt any binding position on the offers from Kabul. During Molotov's visit on 12-13 November the 'relation of Russia to Afghanistan and Iran' was originally to have been discussed;354 Berlin intended, in line with Hitler's political tactics at the time, to make it clear

(31 Dec. 1939). Cf. also Anfuso, Roma, Berlino, 138; Smith, Roman Empire, 197-201: the portrait painted there of a paralysed, totally undecided Mussolini does not seem to correspond to historical truth. 94 Ciano, Diary 1939-1943, 191-2 (31 Dec. 1939). 95 Thus De Felice, 'Beobachtungen', 326. 96 Cf. Siebert, [taliens Weg, 372-6. 24 1.1. Mussolini's 'Non-belligerence' It should be pointed out in this connection that the possibility of a German rapprochement with the Soviet Union had been quite

for the time being to be part and parcel of Berlin's theoretical preparations for the offensive in the west,231 even though Germany soon realized the dilatoriness shown by her Axis partner in the handling of the decisions involved. 232 The euphoria which followed the meeting of the two dictators on the Brenner, on 18 March 1940, proved short-lived. As before, there took place merely a rather general exchange of ideas at attache level. On the Gennan side the realization was gaining ground that

Empire, 171-2. 355 Faldella, L'Icalia, 101. 356 Bocca, Storia, 120. 348 349 4. The Ilalian Fighling Forces 75 The three armoured divisions existing in June 1940 had nothing except their name in common with genuine large-scale formations of this type. 357 The fact that, when Italy entered the war on 10 June, not one of the so-called armoured divisions was stationed in Libya would seem to suggest an as yet insufficient acceptance of the new weapon in the strategic and operational thinking of

circumstances, by no means reflected a lack of interest in the fate of France. On the contrary, the prospect of having the Germans as neighbours across the Pyrenees afforded no pleasure to Madrid. Of course the generalissimo wished for Hitler's victory, but he did not want the dictator to advance right up to his own doorstep. Franco was therefore hoping that a residual France, as intact as possible, would act as a buffer between Spain and the Third Reich. 262 The cunning game of poker over

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