British Armour in the Normandy Campaign (Military History and Policy)
John Buckley
Language: English
Pages: 304
ISBN: 0415407737
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
The popular perception of the performance of British armour in the Normandy campaign of 1944 is one of failure and frustration. Despite overwhelming superiority in numbers, Montgomery's repeated efforts to employ his armour in an offensive manner ended in a disappointing stalemate. Explanation of these and other humiliating failures has centred predominantly on the shortcomings of the tanks employed by British formations. This new study by John Buckley challenges the standard view of Normandy as a failure for British armour by analysing the reality and level of the supposed failure and the causes behind it.
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Ridge was downplayed to reconnaissance by armoured cars which would ‘spread alarm and despondency and... discover “the form”’.104 Only if the situation developed much in VIII Corps’ favour would there be the option to ‘crack about’ as Montgomery put it.105 It is clear that although Dempsey’s optimism had been dampened a little by his immediate commander, and that the expectation was not for a breakout but a writing down of German strength, the 2nd Army commander still harboured hopes for a
forces to support the French army, and the defeat of France and Britain’s change in strategy in 1940 had further emphasised the expansion and support of such forces, placing a still greater burden on available manpower. Additionally, the mobilisation 46 OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUE of the British economy to support the war effort proved a further drain on available pools of personnel, with the consequence that by 1943 the British Army was forced into evaluating its operational technique in line with
tank commanders when coming under direct fire attack was to head for cover. Once safe, they would then begin the process of pinpointing the enemy, which could take some time and some risk. Supporting infantry would be invaluable, as they had much greater capacity for observing enemy fire. Enemy anti-tank guns were more difficult to locate as they were easily camouflaged, but once pinpointed they were vulnerable to direct HE fire. Operational research reports indicated that a troop of tanks firing
reputation. However, the tank was flawed in many ways, the most obvious being the weakness of the main 37 mm armament, which by 1944 standards was nigh on useless. The gun’s HE shell was ineffective and the AP capability was insufficient to inflict damage on opposing German tanks.60 Moreover, the tank’s weak armour and high profile made it particularly vulnerable in northwest Europe where manoeuvring space was at a premium. The Honey was intended to provide reconnaissance elements for armoured
evidence. It is the case that the Panzer III had its armament upped from a 37 mm to a 50 mm, while the Panzer IV increased from a low-velocity 75 mm gun to a HV longer-barrelled 75 mm weapon, but in comparison the British tanks deployed in Normandy had had their armaments increased since 1942 from a 2-pdr, through the 6-pdr and up to the 75 mm in the case of the Churchill, and from the 6-pdr to the 75 mm in the case of the Cromwell. Moreover, the Germans mounted 75 mm guns on the Panzer III
